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Contemporary Christian culture does not know what art is for. C. S. Lewis did. First of all, he 
understood that Christians should not try to change culture by turning art into propaganda. The 
first purpose of art is not to be didactic but to be beautiful and provide pleasure and play. It may 
have secondary purposes—to inspire, to draw us to God—but art cannot achieve these purposes 
without achieving the first. Secondly, Lewis knew that we should not simply analyze art for its 
philosophical underpinnings. Though Lewis recognized the need for Worldview Analysis, this 
approach devalues play and reduces artistic meanings to mere philosophical statements. But 
meanings in artistic texts should be received with the imagination as well as the reasoning 
intellect. Lewis believed in the importance of receiving artistic texts rather than using them, and 
of perceiving them as representing two distinct communications: logos and poiema. Finally, and 
with marked contrast, though Lewis was against using art for propaganda, he nevertheless saw its 
value for moral instruction and inspiration. His ideas on the moral imagination are key to 
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Aesthetics vs. Anesthesia: C. S. Lewis on the Purpose of Art 
Charlie W. Starr, Kentucky Christian University 
 
My astonishing claim is this: Most of evangelical Christianity for the last hundred years 
(and longer) has gotten art and culture all wrong, but, as per usual, C. S. Lewis gets it right. We 
don‟t know what culture is for, we don‟t know what art is for, and we keep asking the wrong 
people: theologians. When we want to overcome a sickness, we go to a doctor. When we want to 
fix a leak, we call a plumber. We ask the experts and get the right answers. Why don‟t we do the 
same with art? We turn to Christians to find Christian answers, and rightly so. But if we want to 
know about art, theologians are not the experts to ask. Artists, on the other hand, frighten us. We 
trust so little of what they do, and they‟re a little weird to begin with, even the Christian ones. 
What we need is a Christian artist (perhaps a writer) with a background in theology—someone 
with the intellectual discipline of a philosopher and the critical eye, experience and imagination 
of an artist. If such a Jack-of-all-trades were to exist, we‟d call him C. S. Lewis. 
I. Is Art Utilitarian? 
 With regard to the significance of the arts or culture in general, Lewis once concluded 
that “culture,
1
 though not in itself meritorious, was innocent and pleasant, might be a vocation 
for some, was helpful in bringing certain souls to Christ, and could be pursued to the glory of 
God.”
2
 Though he valued culture, Lewis did not see it as a final good—an end unto itself. It is 
true that Lewis saw a connection between art and knowledge. In The Great Divorce, for 
example, a painter who has just come into heaven is told that “When you painted on earth…it 
was because you caught glimpses of Heaven in the earthly landscape. The success of your 
                                                 
1
 Of the various topics which could be discussed under the umbrella of cultural analysis, I here intend, following 
Lewis‟s lead, to focus on art. 
2
 “Christianity and Culture,” 85. 
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painting was that it enabled others to see the glimpses too.”
3
 And such glimpses, as Lewis 
himself found in “inanimate nature and marvelous literature” evoke in us an experience of 
“intense longing,”
4
 an “unsatisfied desire which is itself more desirable than any other 
satisfaction.
5
 Lewis calls this desire “Joy,”
6
 and Joy is a marker—a stab of desire whose object is 
not to be found on earth: 
Creatures are not born with desires unless satisfaction for those desires exists. A 
baby feels hunger: well, there is such a thing as food. A duckling wants to swim: 
well, there is such a thing as water. Men feel sexual desire: well, there is such a 
thing as sex. If I find in myself a desire which no experience in this world can 
satisfy, the most probable explanation is that I was made for another world.
7
 
Lewis sees the intense desire he calls Joy as an “ontological proof” for the existence of heaven 
and God.
8
 He says, “if we are made for heaven, the desire for our proper place will be already in 
us, but not yet attached to the true object….”
9
 The desire will, in fact, erupt out of earthly 
encounters of pleasure—encounters with beauty in nature, with sexual pleasure, and with the 
beauty of artistic texts, especially (for Lewis) the literature of myth and fantasy.
10
 But each of 
these earthly objects, then, can be confused for the true, heavenly object, and must be seen as 
merely a signpost, a hint of the real thing.
11
 But the implication for art is that it may potentially 
point us to the truth of God‟s existence. It did for C. S. Lewis. 
                                                 
3
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4
 The Pilgrim’s Regress, 202. 
5
 Surprised by Joy, 17-18. 
6
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 Mere Christianity, 115. 
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9
 “The Weight of Glory,” 98. 
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That said, Lewis did not see the purpose of art to be the production of sermonic tropes or 
Christian propaganda. Even as viewers of art we shouldn‟t look to see if there is a hidden 
Christian message in a movie or book. On the contrary, “The first demand any work of any art 
makes upon us is surrender. Look. Listen. Receive. Get yourself out of the way.”
12
 Writing 
specifically about literature, Lewis claims that whatever edification we get isn‟t about finding 
truth in books: “To value them chiefly for reflections which they may suggest to us or morals we 
may draw from them, is a flagrant instance of „using‟ [texts for our own purposes] instead of 
„receiving‟” [ them for what they are].
13
 Instead, great art is about a particular activity of 
imagination; it is about finding new ways of seeing—about seeing through the eyes of others: 
The nearest I have yet got to an answer [to the question of literature‟s value] is 
that we seek an enlargement of our being. We want to be more than ourselves. 
Each of us by nature sees the whole world from one point of view with a 
perspective and a selectiveness peculiar to himself….We want to see with other 
eyes, to imagine with other imaginations, to feel with other hearts, as well as with 
our own….My own eyes are not enough for me, I will see through those of others. 
Reality, even seen through the eyes of many, is not enough. I will see what others 
have invented….[I]n reading great literature I become a thousand men and yet 
remain myself….Here, as in worship, in love, in moral action, and in knowing, I 
transcend Myself; and am never more myself than when I do.
14
 
                                                 
12
 An Experiment in Criticism, 19. 
13
 Ibid, 82-83. See, especially, all of chapter eight for Lewis‟s discussion on the connections and disconnections 
between art and reality and art and truth. 
14
 Ibid, 137, 140-41. 
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 In short, Lewis very specifically rejects any view that “literature is to be valued…for 
telling us truths about life”
15
; instead, he values literature apart from its utilitarian purposes. This 
flies in the face of much contemporary Christian thinking about art and culture, both on popular 
and intellectual fronts. On the popular front are well meaning Christians who accept the model of 
“culture war”—we are in a battle that must be fought by governing what our kids are exposed to 
and protesting against films, songs and TV shows which are hostile to our point of view. On the 
intellectual front is an emphasis on “worldview analysis”—examining the worldviews behind 
artistic texts to point out there hidden assumptions or mine their truth value. And while both have 
their place, they fail to understand what art is for. 
II. Problems with Worldview Analysis 
 The one time Lewis says anything about what we call worldview analysis is in his essay, 
“Christianity and Culture.” Here he agrees that, in a work of art, 
the real beliefs may differ from the professed and may lurk in the turn of a phrase 
or the choice of an epithet; with the result that many preferences which seem to 
the ignorant to be simply „matters of taste‟ are visible to the trained critic as 
choices between good and evil, or truth and error….
16
 
But he follows this recognition by raising several questions and cautions. One is whether a man 
who has “had a literary training” ought also to be a judge of the worldviews he reveals. Is this 
not the purview of the philosopher?
17
 Secondly, Lewis wonders if aspects of a negative analysis 
have less to do with ideas and more to do with taste.
18
 I read Lewis here as saying that aesthetic 
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 Ibid, 130. 
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 “Christianity and Culture,” 86. 
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 Ibid, 86-87. 
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 Ibid, 87. 
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sensibilities are often ignored in worldview approaches to art. But to Lewis, an artistic text like a 
book is  
both Logos (something said) and Poiema (something made). As Logos it tells a 
story, or expresses an emotion, or exhorts or pleads or describes or rebukes or 
excites laughter. As Poiema, by its aural beauties and also by the balance and 
contrast and the unified multiplicity of its successive parts, it is an objet d’art, a 
thing shaped so as to give great satisfaction.
19
  
Next Lewis takes issue with an approach to art which spends so much time “reading 
between the lines” that it neglects “the obvious surface facts about a book.”
20
 Is it not possible, 
for example, that, despite a book‟s “dreadful latent materialism, it does set courage and fidelity 




Lewis then questions an approach to art which removes any sense of its primary purpose: 
I agree…that our leisure, even our play, is a matter of serious concern…. 
[However,] to do them at all, we must somehow do them as if they were not. It is 
a serious matter to choose wholesome recreations: but they would no longer be 
recreations if we pursued them seriously….For a great deal (not all) of our 
literature was made to be read lightly for entertainment. If we do not read it, in a 
sense, „for fun‟…we are not using it as it was meant to be used, and all our 
criticism of it will be pure illusion. For you cannot judge any artefact except by 
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 An Experiment in Criticism, 132. See also page 82. 
20
 “Christianity and Culture,” 88. 
21
 Ibid, 89. 
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using it as it was intended. It is no good judging a butter-knife by seeing whether 
it will saw logs.
22
 
Finally Lewis offers the tentative suggestion that there might be  
two kinds of good and bad. The first, such as virtue and vice or love and hatred, 
besides being good or bad themselves make the possessor good or bad. The 
second do not. They include such things as physical beauty or ugliness, the 
possession or lack of a sense of humour, strength or weakness, pleasure or pain.
23
 
Lewis sees potential problems with his categories, but I think it legitimate to apply them to the 
arts in this way: If I say a secular film is bad because it is filled with false ideas, foul language, 
gratuitous sex, and gory violence, and then I say a Christian film is bad because the production 
values are cheap, the script overly didactic, the story dull and the acting poor, I am not using the 
word “bad” in the same way. The former is bad for reasons involving morality and truth; the 
latter is bad for reasons involving aesthetics and imaginative effect.
24
 Worldview analysis will 
almost always leave these latter considerations out of the equation. 
 An even stronger argument to be gleaned from Lewis regarding the problems of 
worldview analysis has to do with the nature of “meaning.” “What does it mean?” is a question 
we ask all the time, often about the symbols and images we encounter in books, songs, and 
movies. But do we ever ask, “What does meaning mean?” Usually when we ask for the meaning 
of a word, a line in a song, or a symbolic image, we want an explanation in words. In The Empire 
Strikes Back, Luke journeys down into his own cave of knowledge and confronts Darth Vader. 
He cuts Vader‟s head clean off only to find his own face looking back at him. When my daughter 
first saw this scene she asked me what it meant. I told her, “It means Luke‟s worst enemy is 
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 Ibid, 91. 
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 See below for why these elements matter. 
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himself. He has to fight his own fear and doubt before he can face the real Darth Vader.  What 
happened in the cave was a dream or vision.” I explained the meaning in words. But movies 
mean more than the words in them. Their magic is in the meanings they communicate beyond 
words. Their truth is in their images and experiential quality.  
In a little known essay called “Bluspels and Flalansferes,” Lewis helps us search for the 
meaning of meaning: 
[I]t must not be supposed that I am in any sense putting forward the imagination 
as the organ of truth. We are not talking of truth, but of meaning: meaning which 
is the antecedent condition both of truth and falsehood, whose antithesis is not 
error but nonsense.…For me, reason is the natural organ of truth; but imagination 
is the organ of meaning. Imagination, producing new metaphors or revivifying 
old, is not the cause of truth, but its condition.
25
 
An obscure statement at best, what Lewis argues here, among other things, is that meaning is not 
the same thing as truth, the one belonging to the faculty of imagination, the other to the faculty of 
reason.  
He discusses one major implication of this dichotomy in his essay, “Myth Became Fact,” 
where he makes a connection between “myth” and “reality” and then a separation of “reality” 
from “truth”: “What flows into you from the myth is not truth but reality (truth is always about 
something, but reality is that about which truth is).”
26
 Reality (or fact) is what is; truth is a 
proposition about fact. Next, Lewis describes our earthly existence as a “valley of separation,”
27
 
or abstraction, arguing that “Myth is the mountain whence all the different streams arise which 
                                                 
25
 “Bluspels and Flalansferes,” 265. 
26
 “Myth Became Fact,” 141. 
27
 Ibid, 141n. 
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become truths down here in the valley; in hac valle abstractionis.”
28
 Lewis is saying that 
meaning can be abstract language statements like my explanation of Luke‟s internal struggle in 
Empire Strikes Back. But it can also be experiential and can precede language.  
The context of the “Myth Became Fact” essay is the epistemological dilemma of thinking 
versus experiencing. To know by thought is to withdraw ourselves from reality. To know by 
experience is to be so caught up in the real that we can‟t think about it clearly. Consider how we 
can laugh at a joke or think about why it‟s funny, but we can‟t do both at the same time. More 
importantly, our very ability to know is hampered by this bifurcation: “„If only my toothache 
would stop, I could write another chapter about Pain.‟ But once it stops, what do I know about 
pain?”
29
 We can‟t study pleasure while having sex, “repentance while repenting,” nor humor 
while we‟re laughing hysterically, but “when else can you really know these things?”
30
  
In order to understand how limiting this dilemma really is, Lewis suggests we think about 
the myth of Orpheus and Eurydice. Orpheus was allowed to lead Eurydice by the hand, but the 
moment he tried to turn around and see her, she disappeared. If we focus on the myth, the 
abstract concept of thinking versus experiencing is suddenly “imaginable.” If I take what Lewis 
is saying and explain it in abstract, allegorical statements, then “experience” is Orpheus holding 
Eurydice‟s hand, “thinking” is her disappearing when he turns around to get a clear look at her, 
and the “myth,” apart from this explanation, is an image of these ideas which acts on our 
imagination like an experience. Lewis goes on to note that our response might be that we‟ve 
never seen the meaning just described in the myth of Orpheus and Eurydice. To this he replies, 
“Of course not. You are not looking for an abstract „meaning‟ at all.”
31
 If we were looking for 
                                                 
28
 Ibid, 141.The Latin means, “in this valley of separation.”  
29




 Ibid, 141. 
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abstract meanings in the myth, it would stop being a myth to us and become an allegory (as I just 
made it above). Lewis says that, in receiving the myth as a myth, 
You were not knowing, but tasting; but what you were tasting turns out to be a 
universal principle. The moment we state this principle, we are admittedly back in 
the world of abstraction. It is only while receiving the myth as a story that you 
experience the principle concretely.
32
 
In other words, when we take a meaning out of a myth, we turn it into an abstract statement, an 
idea. When we leave the meaning in the myth and do not try to turn it into language statements, 
the meaning remains (or at least mimics) a concrete experience. Through myth, ideas can be 
experienced concretely. Lewis gives a hint that this occurs in the imagination, a mode of thinking 
that shares qualities of both reason and experience. 
 When we receive myth as story, we are experiencing a principle concretely. Only when 
we put the experience into words does the principle become abstract. But if we can know a 
principle either concretely or by abstraction, then meaning can be either concrete or abstract. 
This agrees with the statement in the “Bluspels” essay that meaning is the necessary antecedent 
to truth.
33
 Some meanings are abstract propositions—word statements like my explanation of the 
scene from Empire Strikes Back. But there are other kinds of meanings which can only be 
grasped in the experiential imagination. Such meanings, the kind we get in myth for example, 
come prior to abstraction and apart from language. From them we do not get truths about reality 
but tastes of reality itself. 
Think of some favorite song, the kind that “blows you away” the first time you hear it. It 
moves you. You connect to it. It evokes feelings and thoughts you can‟t quite describe. Recall 




 “Bluspels and Flalansferes,” 265. 
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next how a month or two (or six) later you actually bother to pay attention to the lyrics, and you 
finally figure out what the song was saying. In one sense you knew all along what the song was 
about. You understood meanings in it that couldn‟t be put into words—meanings in the music 
itself or in the way a certain phrase touched your heart or connected with memories. The analysis 
of the lyrics was your reasoning self becoming aware of abstract, propositional meanings that 
your experiential self had not encountered. To use Lewis‟s terminology, you first tasted the song, 
then you came to know it. But to abandon the taste—the meanings which still cannot be put into 
words even after some analysis—is to abandon meanings which are certainly there. 
The very nature of meaning in art is that many of its meanings will not be philosophically 
reduceable. In an essay called “The Language of Religion,” Lewis points out that, far from being 
able to quantify reality in terms of the specialized languages of science or theology, most of 
experience can only be communicated with plain or poetic language: “Now it seems to me a 
mistake to think that our experience in general can be communicated by precise and literal 
language….The truth seems to me the opposite….”
34
 Even a theologically accurate phrase like, 
“Jesus Christ is the Son of God” is a metaphor.
35
 It is true, but it is not literal. The relationship 
had between Christ and the Father in the Trinity is not the exact same as the relationship had 
between a man and his son. There was a time in which my son did not exist. Then he came into 
existence. But the First and Second Persons of the Trinity have co-existed eternally. We may 
attempt to convert the metaphor into a theological abstraction like, “There is between Jesus and 
God an asymmetrical, social, harmonious relation involving homogeneity,”
36
 but in doing so the 
meaning will be all but lost to us. Lewis concludes that the “very essence of our life as conscious 
beings, all day and every day, consists of something which cannot be communicated except by 
                                                 
34
 “The Language of Religion,” 263. 
35





hints, similes, metaphors, and the use of those emotions…which are pointers to it.”
37
 If life itself 
is seldom reduceable to the abstract language of philosophy and theology, how much more must 
our approach to the arts be one which recognizes meanings that cannot be stated in any terms—
or, at best, in poetic terms—let alone the terms of worldview analysis. Human knowing simply 
doesn‟t operate that way, and human art belongs more to the realms of concrete experience and 
analogical imagination.  
For Lewis, meaning is connection, the perception of a relationship. But we can‟t think of 
meaning as solely an explanation in words. When we break out of that thinking, we begin to see 
art‟s purpose and methods. Art communicates experiences more than abstract truths and 
meanings more than philosophical positions. The meanings in art may be born of language, and 
such meanings may be translate into truth statements. But many of the meanings will exist apart 
from language. Many of them will be mythic, analogical, experiential, emotional, unconscious, 
semi-conscious, without clear definition, and even accidental. 
Here, then, is the problem for worldview analysis: if the only thing we look for in 
examining an art form is a series of abstract, philosophical truth statements, we are missing both 
the power and purpose of art. I am not saying we should forget about examining worldviews in 
art (and neither did Lewis in “Christianity and Culture”). I am saying that worldview analysis 
tends to look for philosophical thought systems and nothing else. Students taught this approach 
to art end up with a myopic critical vision. Imagine reducing the art of cooking to mere nutrition. 
We certainly need to know about it in order to be healthy, but if the joy of taste is sacrificed to 
nutritional facts, then food is reduced to a burden our taste buds must merely endure. Food needs 
to have flavor! And art needs to delight and to give us tastes of the real. This means it should 
first be approached experientially and imaginatively before it is ever viewed philosophically. 
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III. Art’s Purposes 
None of this is to say that Lewis completely rejects the “using” of art in education. 
Though he primarily values art apart from its truth-bearing potentials, he nevertheless strikes a 
balance for us between our desires to enjoy art for what it is on the one hand and use it for 
edification on the other:  
The purpose of education has been described by Milton as that of fitting a man “to 
perform justly, skillfully, and magnanimously all the offices both private and 
public, of peace and war.”…Aristotle would substantially agree with this, but 
would add the conception that it should also be a preparation for leisure…. 
Vocational training, on the other hand, prepares the pupil not for leisure, but for 
work; it aims at making not a good man but a good banker, a good electrician, a 
good scavenger, or a good surgeon. You see at once that education is essentially 




Christian thinking about the arts—here I mean the thinking of American, Protestant, 
Conservative, Evangelical Christianity—has suffered from pragmatism and didacticism. Rather 
than “enjoy” or “appreciate” art, we “use” it like dishes and cars to serve functions we consider 
important. What Lewis is saying is that, if art can serve the Kingdom of God, it is a good thing, 
but art created for the purpose of spreading the Kingdom of God (which is to say, art created for 
any purpose other than what art is for) will generally be bad, that is, inartistic. To use Lewis‟s 
terms, art thus becomes vocational, training beats education, and civilization (as it might be 
influenced by Christians) dies. Bad Christian art ends up defeating its own purposes. It doesn‟t 
reach anyone, and it quickly fades into obscurity.  
                                                 
38
 “Our English Syllabus,” 81-82. 
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 Imagine a young man who wants to be a missionary doctor but who is so completely 
interested in spreading the gospel that he doesn‟t work hard at first becoming a good physician. 
Suppose that, with a little bit of training and a lot of funding from equally zealous Christians, he 
manages to get out to a third world country and practice medicine. In the field he tries his best as 
a doctor, but he just isn‟t very good at it—perhaps he is especially bad at administering 
anesthesia—and the consequences are dire. Of course he won‟t have any success in reaching 
people for Christ when he has failed them first at what he claimed to be—a physician.  
Sound ridiculous? Yet this is exactly what goes on in Christian film making all the time: 
people zealous to spread the gospel, who don‟t know enough about making movies, produce 
celluloid sermons instead of real films. But before a movie can teach truth it must first be what 
films are: stories that enlighten, engage, show beauty, entertain, capture our imaginations, and 
put us through experiences. It is by happy coincidence and thanks to Lewis‟s unusual spelling of 
the word “anaesthetics”
39
 that I learned the words “aesthetic” (the study of beauty), and 
“anesthetic” (the thing we most want the doctor to give us when going under the knife) come 
from the same root word, having to do with feeling or sensation. I am convinced that much of 
modern Christianity suffers from an anesthetic view of art. The result is Christian art which bores 
us to sleep. 
 Contrary to an anesthetic, utilitarian view of art, Lewis, like his friend Tolkien, valued the 
making of fairy tale stories (for example) especially when produced as an act of “sub-creation,” 
of doing on a finite level what God did infinitely at the creation.
40
 The purpose of such sub-
creation is not to make something to be used for other purposes, but to participate in pleasure and 
worship in acting out in ourselves the Divine impulse of creativity given us as bearers of the 
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 Applied to the arts in general, the point is that we make art for the delight of 
making. That act alone is sufficient reason for a book‟s, painting‟s, or movie‟s existence—it is 
made out of delight, out of a God given desire to imitate Him. It is an act of worship. 
But the by-product of such activity is art that can have an effect on our civilization. 
Lewis concludes that, to be truly effective in affecting culture, we must stop making the affecting 
of culture our first goal:
42
 “We must attack the enemy‟s lines of communication, [this is true. But 
w]hat we want is not more little books about Christianity, but more little books by Christians on 
other subjects—with their Christianity latent.”
43
 Recall Lewis‟s statement that leisure and play 
are of serious concern, but we cannot approach them too seriously.
44
 Here he is saying the same 
thing about art. Unless we are doing it in our leisure, with a sense of play, and out of our God 
given creative (or sub-creative) impulses, it will not be good art. All we have to do is think of the 
difference between The Passion of the Christ and Facing the Giants for the point to become 
obvious. Admittedly, it is also counter-intuitive. But this, according to Lewis, is because we live 
in a fallen world in which play is frivolous: 
Dance and game are frivolous, unimportant down here; for “down here” is not 
their natural place. Here they are a moment‟s rest from the life we were placed 
here to live. But in this world everything is upside down. That which, if it could 
be prolonged here, would be a truancy, is likest that which in a better country is 
the End of ends. Joy is the serious business of Heaven.
45
 
And art, then, can perhaps only be serious when it is created in play. 
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 “On Three Ways of Writing for Children,” 509. 
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 See below for Lewis‟s own example of how the Narnia books came into being. 
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 “Christian Apologetics,” 150. Lewis also says, “It is not the books written in direct defense of Materialism that 
make the modern man a materialist; it is the materialistic assumptions in all the other books. In the same way, it is 
not books on Christianity that will really trouble him [the anti-Christian]. But he would be troubled if, whenever he 
wanted a cheap popular introduction to some science, the best work on the market was always by a Christian” (Ibid). 
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 “Christianity and Culture,” 90. 
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IV. The Moral Imagination 
Once again, though Lewis believed literature and other arts were not meant to be “used” 
for their truth value but “received” for their experiential delight, he did acknowledge the 
important relationship between art and moral development. 
In an essay called “Horrid Red Things,” Lewis argues that one of the things Christians 
must do to reach “modern” people is to “try to teach them something about the difference 
between thinking and imagining.”
46
 He illustrates: 
I once heard a lady tell her daughter that if you ate too many aspirin tablets you 
would die. “But why?” asked the child. “If you squash them you don‟t find any 
horrid red things inside them.” Obviously, when this child thought of poison she 
not only had an attendant image of “horrid red things”, but she actually believed 
that poison was red. And this is an error….[However,] If I, staying at the house, 
had raised a glass of what looked like water to my lips, and the child had said, 
“Don‟t drink that. Mummie says it‟s poisonous,” I should have been foolish to 
disregard the warning....There is thus a distinction not only between thought and 
imagination in general, but even between thought and those images which the 
thinker (falsely) believes to be true.
47
 
You see, the little girl clearly knew that poison was a bad thing, but she also thought that it was 
red. She had a right idea and a wrong image. And this wrong image could clearly lead the little 
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girl to someday taking poison, not because she thinks poison good, but because the object she‟s 
about to swallow doesn‟t look poisonous to her. 
 Lewis presents this dichotomy again in The Screwtape Letters where a newly converted 
Christian is floundering in a sea of images confused with ideas. Elder demon Screwtape writes to 
hip pupil Wormwood about how best to tempt his patient: 
At his present stage, you see, he has an idea of „Christians‟ in his mind which he 
supposes to be spiritual but which, in fact, is largely pictorial. His mind is full of 
togas and sandals and armour and bare legs and the mere fact that the other people 




Consider how the American church today, without quite knowing how it was working, has had 
some success in reversing this trend through converting the classical worship service into the 
contemporary celebration of song and music. Removing the images that got in the way of 
belief—stained-glass stuffiness, hardened pews and faces, boring liturgy and pasted smiles—the 
church in the last thirty years has been able to draw people to the truth of Christ, not by 
restructuring Christian content, as liberal Christianity attempted to do, but by reconstructing the 
imaginative art forms (primarily in music and architecture) by which it is presented. 
 Lewis saw this exact need. At the writing of the Narnia books, there were those who 
believed that Lewis began by asking himself how he could share Christ with children which he 
thought best doable through fairy tales. Then he supposedly drew up a list of Christian truths he 
wanted to share with kids and put them into allegories. Says Lewis, 
This is all pure moonshine. I couldn‟t write in that way at all. Everything began 
with images; a faun carrying an umbrella, a queen on a sledge, a magnificent lion. 
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At first there wasn‟t even anything Christian about them; that element pushed 
itself in of its own accord. It was part of the bubbling.
49
 
Notice how Lewis here follows his own advice regarding the earlier point that we should not 
make art for the purpose of affecting culture, but rather culture will be affected if we make good 
art. 
 More important to the current point is what Lewis says came after the “bubbling,” after 
he recognized that fairy tales were the best form he could find for all the creative energy he was 
about to unleash on paper: 
I thought I saw how stories of this kind could steal past a certain inhibition which 
had paralysed much of my own religion in childhood. Why did one find it so hard 
to feel as one was told one ought to feel about God or about the sufferings of 
Christ? I thought the chief reason was that one was told one ought to. An 
obligation to feel can freeze feelings. And reverence itself did harm….But 
supposing that by casting all these things into an imaginary world, stripping them 
of their stained-glass and Sunday school associations, one could make them for 




Lewis achieved this in Narnia and the church has begun to do the same in our culture, making 
some inroads in music if still falling short in literature, film and other art forms. 
 The point is a simple one: human beings pursue knowledge of the real through two 
modes of thought: reason and imagination. The first deals in abstract language and propositional 
statements. The second deals in images and concrete (even vicarious) experiences. Both matter 
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for knowing, but imagination has been ignored or reduced in importance since the 
Enlightenment, and imagination is definitely more important in moral education than is reason. 
 This is Lewis‟s point in The Abolition of Man: 
St. Augustine defines virtue as ordo amoris, the ordinate condition of the 
affections in which every object is accorded that kind and degree of love which is 
appropriate to it. Aristotle says that the aim of education is to make the pupil like 
and dislike what he ought. When the age for reflective thought comes, the pupil 
who has been thus trained in „ordinate affections‟ or „just sentiments‟ will easily 
find the first principles in Ethics: but to the corrupt man they will never be visible 
at all and he can make no progress in that science. Plato before him had said the 
same. The little human animal will not at first have the right responses. It must be 
trained to feel pleasure, liking, disgust, and hatred at those things which really are 
pleasant, likeable, disgusting, and hateful….All this before he is of an age to 
reason; so that when Reason at length comes to him, then, bred as he has been, he 




In plainer words: an  imaginative understanding of goodness—one gleaned from story, song, 
beauty, an education that ties real qualities of the real to the feelings they ought to invoke—must 
precede a reasoned knowledge of moral precepts. Or, to use my anesthesia metaphor, a true 
aesthetic recognizes that good art teaches us how we ought to feel about things—objects, places, 
experiences—while bad art anesthetizes us to the good which ought to govern us. Lewis calls the 
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products of such bad education, “Men without Chests.”
52




Teach second graders the Ten Commandments all you want; it‟s the story of Elijah and 
the prophets of Baal that they‟ll hold onto when someone questions commandment one before 
them. Lewis says that “no justification of virtue will enable a man to be virtuous. Without the aid 
of trained emotions the intellect is powerless against the animal organism.”
54
 If reason is to rule 
the appetites, it can only do so through the power of a third element, an imaginative sense of 
what‟s right or ought to be or (the technical term that I use), cool. 
 Coolness is what drew many of us to Christ. Whether it was the experience of a weekend 
long Christian Rave, the raucous joy of an Alt-Band concert praising God, the fantasy story by 
Lewis or Tolkien that drew our curiosity, the wise mentor, the high school friend who seemed to 
have it all together, the hip youth minister or the tattooed-and-pierced coffee house friend who 
showed the beauty or nobility of Christ to us before we ever thought Christianity might be true—
that was what drew us first. 
 In the passage on the creation of the Narnia stories above, Lewis connects story to 
stealing “past watchful dragons,” that is to recovering right moral sensibilities through 
imagination as well as envisioning Christianity by the same. His own poster child for the failure 
of abstract, storyless ethical education which leaves imagination and right response to experience 
out of the equation appears in his Narnia novel, The Voyage of the Dawn Treader. It begins, 
“There was a boy called Eustace Clarence Scrubb, and he almost deserved it.”
55
 Eustace is the 
worst kind of child Lewis could imagine: one raised by “modern” parents. Eustace hates fairy-
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tales, preferring books of information containing “pictures of grain elevators or of fat foreign 
children doing exercises in model schools.”
56
 Eustace is pretentious, petty, spiteful, and selfish.  
He is cruel to animals (even talking ones), steals water on a sea voyage when low supplies 
demand strict rations, acts a coward while hiding behind the self-righteousness of claiming to be 
a pacifist, and complains when the only girl on the voyage gets the only private cabin.  
Eustace‟s problem is that he hasn‟t read any imaginative books like fairy-tales or 
adventure stories and so hasn‟t received proper moral instruction. He doesn‟t even recognize a 
dragon when he sees one because “he had read none of the right books.”
57
 Upon approaching a 
dragon‟s cave, Eustace is confused by what he finds there. Says Lewis: “Most of us know what 
we should expect to find in a dragon‟s lair, but, as I said before, Eustace had read only the wrong 
books. They had a lot to say about exports and imports and governments and drains, but they 
were weak on dragons.”
58
 Later in the novel, Eustace‟s cousin Edmund is able to solve a mystery 
because he is the “only one of the party who had read several detective stories.”
59
  In other 
words, his imagination has been trained through the experience of fiction so that, in his thinking, 
he is capable of seeing what others cannot.   
           What Eustace most needs is to experience reality so that he can know with his heart and 
not just his head; however, because he is too far gone into the abstract, theoretical shadow world 
of facts, figures, and practical applications, he needs more than just a dose of reality. He needs a 
higher reality, a world of the fantastic far more real than his own. He gets Narnia. Eustace is 
pulled into Narnia where, having learned before only in the abstract, about lifeless things, he can 
now learn by concrete experience of the really real. It takes becoming a dragon himself, and then 
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being “undragoned” by Aslan, but Eustace does finally learn what his cold, analytical heart had 
been missing. 
 Art can be analyzed for its philosophical underpinnings and used to teach. It can glorify 
God, speak truth, and be used to build His Kingdom. It can even be used for moral development 
and instruction. But it can be used for none of these purposes if they become our primary reasons 
for making art or receiving it. C. S. Lewis is clear: we make art out of pleasure, for play, out of 
our leisure, and because we bear the creative impulse of a creative God. And we read, view, and 
listen to art because it‟s fun, it gives us new experiences, it delights our imaginations, and it 
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